Introduction

For much of the historiography of late imperial China, studies often portrayed the Qing empire as relatively distant from the maritime world. More recent scholarship, however, has begun to question and rework this assumption.¹ Not only have these studies recovered a much richer and more nuanced vision of Qing statecraft than previously understood, they have also expanded the field of inquiry to topics well beyond those falling under the purview of sea-trade, migration, and port cities. For instance, historians have convincingly argued that Qing rulers cared much more about maritime issues than previously thought. The importance of these arguments is historiographical in that they encourage us to rethink old understandings of late imperial Chinese statecraft and its relationship to the wider world. By trading with others, administering coastal populations, and regulating sea-lanes and suppressing pirates in order to govern an empire with oceanic as well as land borders, Qing emperors, officials, and armies participated in global processes.² My own research has argued that the Qing in the long eighteenth century should be situated within a maritime context.³ But to be clear, I am not trying to suggest that the Qing was an absolute sea power in the early modern era. Rather, my intentions are two-fold: to explore how the Qing as a continental empire interacted with the maritime world and to bring into sharper focus the connection between the Qing and the sea prior to the outbreak of the First Opium War.

Moreover, such revisionist perspectives have encouraged scholars to look beyond Guangdong and Fujian, the two southern provinces where most European traders were concentrated. Through scholarship that acknowledges all of coastal China, from the Bohai Gulf in the north to the Zhejiang coast in the east, as vital to China’s oceanic contacts, late imperial China now looks more maritime-minded and more multi-regionally engaged. Recognizing maritime China’s diversity has allowed for a more thorough understanding of how the Qing managed its maritime borders, as well as how each region interacted with the empire differently.

Qing interactions across the sea were not limited to domestic concerns. Several studies also highlight the place of the Qing within late imperial China’s ongoing renegotiation of maritime space. This included renegotiating relationships with neighbours like Japan, Korea, the Ryukyu Kingdom, and Southeast Asia, as well as foreign powers like Britain and the Netherlands. The maritime world of the eighteenth century was one characterized by connectivity and fragmentation, exchange and conflict, negotiation and assertion, and the Qing was by no means inactive in shaping and reacting to these processes. Through its maritime trade policies, management of border trade, and deployments of military might, the Qing positioned itself as an indispensable player in the regional and global maritime context.

This very short article attempts to review changing trends and attitudes toward the Qing Empire and the sea during the long eighteenth century. More specifically, it will briefly argue that new scholarship has exploded perceptions of Qing China as inward-looking and continental by discovering a thriving and varied Qing relationship with the seas. My reflections on the expanded geographical breadth of scholarship, newfound connections between Qing political structures and maritime activity, and reconceptualizations of what maritime China looked like during this period will perhaps shed some light on the Qing and maritime studies. In doing so, this small piece also reflects on how these historiographical shifts prompt us to reconsider late imperial China’s strategies for managing its borders according to its specific priorities and circumstances.

Questioning the Land-Focused Image of the Qing Empire

Historians traditionally considered the Qing dynasty a land empire. Much of this understanding came from their reliance on military might to expand its territory throughout Central Asia and governing massive continental borders. Scholars emphasized the Manchu military conquest of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia when analyzing the Qing empire as further proof of its status as a continental power.⁴ Consequently, its interaction with the maritime world was often relegated to the margins, viewed as reactive measures to external threats or as limited engagement with European merchants in southern China, specifically in Canton (Guangzhou). While the traditional narrative captured key aspects of Qing expansion and governance, it failed to recognize a maritime realm that was essential to Qing rule over its coastal regions and its broader interactions with the expanding global market.

One of the major reasons behind this land-centric portrayal lies in the sources that were traditionally emphasized. Historical narratives of the Qing have often focused on court documents, military treatises and compendia, as well as campaigns or territory-related reports/albums focusing on Central Asia and the northern borderlands. Documents like these necessarily focused on the Qing consolidation and expansion of its terrestrial borders, so it made sense for scholars to privilege these topics in their research. In the past few decades, however, as scholars have started to mine imperial archives for documents relating to maritime issues (and discovered that there was quite a significant quantity of them), they have also begun to pay attention to other primary sources that reveal much about Qing maritime activity, including maritime customs records (not to be confused with the Customer Service system of the nineteenth century), local gazetteers, private writings written by scholar officials, and regional sites such as carvings on stones or rocks, and inscriptions on coastal temples.⁵ These valuable sources reveal that the Qing, far from being indifferent to maritime matters, was actively engaged in managing their coastal territories, building naval defences, and, above all, interacting with the sea on their own terms in various ways.

An important shift in thinking about the Qing’s maritime engagement stems from the realization that the empire’s geographical and political challenges extended beyond land. As China had a long coastline running from the Bohai Gulf in the north to Guangdong in the south, the coastal regions were vulnerable to piracy, foreign invasion, and smuggling, all of which required the Qing to pay considerable attention to maritime governance. Domestic and foreign maritime trade was also significant to the Qing economy, and port cities other than the famous “Pearl of the East” Canton, including Fuzhou, Ningbo, Dengzhou, and Tianjin served as important hubs of trade that connected China to the world economy throughout the century.

One illustrative example of the Qing’s maritime engagement is the empire’s response to piracy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Although most pirates of the time were considered minor threats, there were times when pirates were flourishing along the southern coast. Pirate activities along Guangdong and Fujian in particular threatened Qing control and challenged trade, affecting mainly coastal provinces. As can be read in edicts from the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors, the Qing dynasty found themselves dispatching naval forces on multiple occasions to help quell pirate operations. Local officials were still negotiating with notorious pirate Zheng Yi and later his wife, Zheng Yi Sao in the early nineteenth century even when the Qing court could not fully assert its dominance at sea.⁶ Whether or not these were sensible or effective measures is up for debate, but the Qing never allowed their efforts against piracy to lapse, both in times of relative stability and in more chaotic circumstances.

When discussing the problem of piracy, one cannot overlook the development of Qing naval power during the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong reigns. On various occasions, these emperors emphasized the importance of the sea to the dynasty’s broader strategic goals. While the three emperors are often remembered for their campaigns in Inner Asia, they also took significant steps to strengthen Qing naval capacity, such as in response to the threat posed by the remnants of the Ming loyalist regime based in Taiwan, led by Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), as well as to be cautious about potential threats, including the Japanese and some European seafaring powers based in Southeast Asia, that might be arriving from the sea. The successful Qing conquest of Taiwan in 1683 was a pivotal moment in the consolidation of Qing power, both on land and sea. It not only brought the strategically important island under Qing control but also marked the beginning of more systematic Qing attention to maritime defence and governance.

Furthermore, the Qing’s maritime engagement extended beyond military and administrative concerns to include diplomacy and foreign relations. Qing rulers were acutely aware of the need to manage their interactions with maritime powers, particularly European states such as Britain and the Netherlands. Although the Qing initially restricted European trade to the port of Canton, this was not merely an act of isolation, but rather a strategic decision to control foreign interactions while maximizing economic benefits. The Canton system, which governed European trade with China from the mid-eighteenth century, reflects the Qing’s careful balancing act between maintaining sovereignty and engaging with the global maritime economy. Historians have also argued that foreign traders, for their part, found the system advantageous, viewing Canton as the ideal place to conduct business with the Chinese.⁷ In other words, European traders had little incentive to venture beyond Canton or sail further north for trade prior to the Macartney Mission of 1793. The system evidently functioned effectively for much of the eighteenth century, as it fulfilled the needs of European traders while allowing the Qing to regulate the flow of goods and foreigners into China, ensuring that merchants adhered to Chinese laws and customs.

In addition to its maritime engagements, recent scholarship has highlighted significant parallels between the Qing’s approaches to its Inner Asian and maritime frontiers.⁸ Both frontiers—one defined by the vast steppe and desert regions of Central Asia, the other by the expansive coastline and sea routes—presented the Qing dynasty with similar challenges in terms of sovereignty, control, and integration into the imperial system. Researchers have increasingly recognized that Qing rulers adopted comparable strategies in consolidating power over these diverse, often unruly borderlands. For instance, both the maritime and Inner Asian frontiers were marked by a reliance on military force to suppress rebellion and external threats, as well as by the strategic use of deliberate policies to manage relations with powerful local elites and foreign actors. On the Inner Asian frontier, this took the form of compromise and negotiation with Mongol elites. On the maritime frontier, the Qing co-opted local coastal elites and foreign merchants to help guarantee order and trade.⁹

Moreover, the Qing’s approach to consolidating control over these frontiers involved a dual focus on military and administrative integration. In both cases, the Qing established garrisons, fortified key positions, and implemented systems of governance that integrated frontier regions into the broader imperial structure. Just as the conquest of Xinjiang in the late eighteenth century involved the construction of new administrative networks and military outposts, the incorporation of Taiwan and the regulation of coastal regions after the conquest of Koxinga’s regime in 1683 followed a similar pattern. In both frontiers, the Qing sought not only to pacify and control these regions but also to integrate them into the empire’s economy and governance structures. This process of consolidation reflected the Qing’s broader imperial strategy of combining force with accommodation, ensuring that both maritime and inland frontiers were effectively brought under its control.

These parallels form the basis of an emerging trend in Qing history that moves beyond the traditional land-sea dichotomy by viewing the Qing as a dynamic and pragmatic early modern empire capable of addressing both terrestrial and maritime interests. This alternative approach does not see the Qing’s Inner Asian and maritime frontier as totally separate, but places them on similar conceptual grounds by highlighting their importance to Qing state-building. This viewpoint allows us to see similarities between the Qing’s administration of these frontier zones, both of which required military might, strategic trading practices, and systematic control over people and resources. By understanding these similarities in frontier development we can better study how the Qing served as an Asian giant in the early modern period. While this approach is still developing, and it may be too early to determine its full impact, it marks a promising step toward a more integrated understanding of the Qing Empire’s frontier management, both on land and at sea.

Expanding the Geographic Focus Beyond Southern China

Until recently, scholarly attention on Qing China’s maritime engagement has been largely concentrated on southern regions, particularly Guangdong and Fujian—what I have elsewhere termed “Southeast China centrism.”¹⁰ This regional emphasis was understandable, as these provinces were key hubs of maritime trade and the main points of interaction with European merchants, notably through the Canton trade system. However, recent scholarship has broadened the geographic scope, recognizing that focusing solely on southern China presents an incomplete picture of the Qing Empire’s maritime strategies and governance. By extending analysis to the entire Chinese seaboard, including northern and eastern coastal regions, historians have uncovered a more comprehensive understanding of the Qing dynasty’s engagement with the maritime world. This expanded focus highlights the importance of regions such as the Bohai Gulf, the southern and eastern coasts of the Shandong peninsula, and Zhejiang, emphasising that maritime China in the Qing period was not monolithic but regionally diverse, with each coastal area playing a distinct role in the empire’s maritime policies.

A key driver of this historiographical shift has been the realization that northern coastal regions, particularly those around the Bohai Gulf, played a crucial role in the Qing’s maritime defence. While Guangdong and Fujian were central to foreign trade and diplomatic interactions with European powers, northern China was vital to domestic maritime commerce and defence against potential threats, whether from Japanese invaders or local piratical forces. The Bohai Gulf, situated between present-day Liaoning and Shandong provinces, was not only a key fishing and salt-producing area but also a strategic location for the Qing military. Its proximity to Beijing, the imperial capital, and Manchuria, the Manchu homeland, further spoke to its significance. Defensive fortifications and naval patrols established in the region were crucial in protecting these strategic and symbolic areas from potential maritime incursions. The recent discovery of sea charts (see fig. 1) and private documents related to Sino-Korean private trade further highlight the Bohai and Yellow Seas as critical zones of exchange and interaction. As noted in the Chaoxian wangchao Yingzu shilu,

Fig. 1. Haijiang yangjie xingshi quantu (compiled in the late eighteenth century) features the Miaodao Archipelago, which geographically guards a strategiccorridor entering the Bohai Gulf.

Although these activities were considered illegal and problematic from an administrative standpoint, the extract above reveals that private, non-state trade was quite widespread between China and Korea. This trade, albeit illegal, contributed to the region’s economic vitality and strengthened the shadow market linking the two countries. In this context, the Qing’s engagement with its northern maritime frontier becomes crucial for understanding the dynamics across the sea space near their power base.

In addition to its defensive importance, northern China’s maritime economy also constituted a significant segment of the Qing Empire. The region’s coastal communities were deeply involved in fishing, salt production, and shipping—industries that contributed significantly to both the local and national economies. For instance, the salt production in Shandong was one of the largest in China, and the industry was strictly regulated by the Qing state, which derived substantial revenue from it. Along with sea salt, seaweed cultivation also thrived along the Liaodong Peninsula. In his Jilin waiji, for instance, Sa Ying’e recorded, 

This passage put forward the richness of northern China’s maritime resources, specifically seaweed, which was not only a source of food but also of medicinal and economic value. The reference to haizao in the Tangshu and its mention of kombu from the southern seas suggest a long-standing recognition of the importance of marine products across different regions of China. The abundance of seaweed in Hunchun, as noted by Sa Ying’e, reflects the prosperous nature of the region’s maritime industries during the Qing period. The cultivation and trade of such resources further suggest the significance of the northern coast in the broader Qing economic system, demonstrating that the maritime economy of northern China was not necessarily secondary to that of the south. Instead, it played an integral role in sustaining both the local population and the empire’s broader economic framework.

In addition, the northern ports were also a hub for internal trade in grain. Ships transported rice and other necessities from the south to supply the people of Beijing and its hinterland, especially when the Grand Canal was damaged or undergoing maintenance. Sometimes relief supplies were organized and shipped by sea to the northern maritime provinces when they were hit by famine or natural disasters. For instance, there was a major natural disaster that occurred in Shandong Peninsula in 1704 during the late

Kangxi era,

Fig. 2. An excerpt of the Shengzu renhuangdi shilu

(please refer to note 13)

This excerpt illustrates how the Qing state, through its maritime capabilities, was able to mobilize resources quickly and effectively, and that sea transportation allowed Qing authorities to respond swiftly to natural disasters in northern China. Because grain was transported along coastal sea routes, it also demonstrates that northern maritime regions were not peripheral to China’s economy, but rather were tied into the networks that buttressed Qing state power. Governance of northern maritime regions was thus related not only to defence and trade, but to disaster relief and state responses to environmental crises.

Another region that has gained increased attention in recent historiography is Zhejiang, which, though located in eastern China, was distinct from the more heavily studied southern provinces. Zhejiang was both a centre of trade and a hub of intellectual activity, with its coastal cities, such as Zhapu, playing a critical role in the empire’s engagement with the East Asian maritime world. Zhapu, in particular, was important for trade with Japan, highlighting the diversity of Qing maritime interactions beyond the southern ports. The city was also a centre for trading Chinese commodities that linked Zhejiang’s economy either through Canton to global markets, or directly from Zhejiang to Japan.¹⁴ Moreover, scholars have increasingly emphasized that Zhejiang’s economic and cultural flourishing was largely due to its strong maritime connections with Japan.¹⁵

The growing attention to Zhejiang also sheds light on the fact that intellectual and cultural exchanges in the maritime world were not confined to the south. The region was home to numerous influential scholars and officials who contributed significantly to Qing governance and intellectual life. For example, officials from Zhapu and nearby areas were instrumental in advising the court on coastal defence and maritime policy, drawing on local knowledge of the sea and its economic importance. This intellectual engagement shows that the Qing’s maritime world was not just about economic and military governance but also involved sophisticated policy discussions and the application of local expertise. These regional officials played a key role in shaping the Qing state’s understanding of the maritime world, making Zhejiang a crucial player in the broader imperial maritime strategy.

Fig. 3. The seascape of Zhapu as depicted by the British following the Battle of Chapu in 1842. Illustration by Thomas Allom and G. N. Wright from China, in a Series of Views, Displaying the Scenery, Architecture, and Social Habits of That Ancient Empire, vol. 3, (London: Fisher, Son, & Co., 1843), p. 49.

Furthermore, the maritime history of northern and eastern China reveals both commonalities and regional variations in how the Qing state managed its coastal populations and resources. In the south, particularly in Guangdong and Fujian, Qing officials focused primarily on regulating foreign trade and controlling smuggling. Similarly, in the north, there was an emphasis on maintaining security and promoting domestic economic activity. However, differences in governance emerged, particularly in how the state addressed specific regional concerns. For instance, the Qing’s regulation of salt production in the Bohai Gulf and its investment in coastal defence in Shandong reflect a distinct set of priorities compared to those in the south. These differences illustrate that the Qing’s approach to maritime governance was neither uniform nor unidirectional, but rather adapted to the specific conditions and challenges of each region.

By expanding the geographic scope of analysis, historians have begun to redefine what is meant by “maritime China” in the late imperial era. Previously, maritime China was often equated with the southern regions, particularly the bustling port cities of Canton and Amoy (Xiamen). However, the recognition that northern and eastern China also played a crucial role in the empire’s maritime strategy challenges this narrow definition. In this broader view, maritime China encompasses the entire coastline, with each region contributing to the empire’s maritime governance in distinct ways. This more inclusive definition offers a deeper understanding of the Qing state’s relationship with the sea, revealing that maritime China was not solely about trade with the West or the so-called “Nanyang connection,” but was a complex, multifaceted entity that involved domestic commerce, regional defence, and interactions with neighbouring Asian powers. While much focus has been placed on Sino-Japanese or Sino-Korean relations, the Qing-Ryukyu relationship is also worth examining. However, due to the constraints of word count, I encourage readers, if I may, to explore this topic further in one of the chapters of my forthcoming monograph, which is expected to be released in October this year.¹⁶

Broadening our geographic scope has methodological ramifications for thinking about Qing state governance of maritime space. New approaches and findings presented here demonstrate that the Qing’s interest and involvement in maritime space was not confined to southeast China. In fact, the Qing state’s approach was more holistic and nimble than what scholarship has thus far portrayed. While natural security concerns and extraction of resources drove much of the Qing policy and initiatives in the north, they varied by region throughout the empire’s coastline and maritime frontier.

As a result, the expansion of the geographic focus from southern China to include the entire Chinese seaboard marks a critical shift in our understanding of Qing maritime governance. In paying greater attention to the northern and eastern coastline of China, our understanding of how the Qing interacted with the maritime world around them has necessarily changed, becoming far more inclusive and less regionally biased. This new focus allows for a better overall conception of maritime China as it better accounts for regional variation in how the Qing state controlled, manipulated, and interacted with its coastline and sea through military might, economic interests, and intellectual curiosity.

Our understanding of Qing interaction with the sea has expanded significantly since the turn of the century. Contributing to the broadening definition of “maritime China” beyond the southern coast, scholarship on Qing interactions with the maritime world has increased in quantity and quality. Once mostly relegated to studies of southern China and its encounter with European powers, we can now see how the entire Chinese coast, from North to South (Bohai Gulf to Zhejiang coast), and even beyond in the South China Sea, factored into Qing dealings with the sea politically, militarily, economically, and even conceptually.

While this expanded definition of maritime China necessarily stretches China’s geographical boundaries, it also allows us to think about maritime China differently. By examining how the Qing interacted with the sea and its coastal populations we can better understand the intersection of maritime concerns with broader issues of territory, security, and state-building within the empire. As this discussion has shown, the Qing engaged with the sea for more than the purposes of taxation or warfare. Managing both coastal and offshore zones supported Qing efforts to consolidate authority over China proper, regulate coastal and maritime populations at home and abroad, and incorporate frontier regions into the empire. From regulating the salt production centres of Shandong to managing fishing villages along the Bohai Gulf, coastal communities helped keep the empire stable and its borders secure from within. Exerting control over the activities of these seafaring communities was also about exerting sovereignty over maritime space.

Moreover, the Qing’s maritime governance reflects a broader imperial strategy that resonates with its land-based policies in Inner Asia. In both contexts, the Qing sought to integrate diverse frontier regions through a combination of military force, administrative governance, and cultural co-optation. Taiwan’s successful conquest and later naval operations against piracy further confirm how maritime endeavours during this time were integrated with larger imperial projects of exercising military force and demonstrating sovereignty. The similarities between maritime and continental strategies align with the understanding that the Qing perceived its inner sea as complementary to larger goals of territorial control and political stability.

This broader conceptual understanding of maritime China offers an opportunity to revisit how we think about empire-building in the Qing period. Efforts to project sovereignty over its maritime frontier not only responded to diplomatic and commercial imperatives, but were also part of the Qing court’s selffashioning as an Asian empire. Engagement with this maritime space also enabled the Qing to balance their roles as rulers of diverse borderland territories with their participation in an increasingly interconnected transregional economy. Qing approaches to different aspects of maritime policy, from private trade to diplomacy with Asian and Western powers, demonstrate the flexibility with which the court operated across its blue frontier.